This essay analyzes some key moments of transnational Palestinian solidarity politics as a basis for considering the possibilities for challenging the status quo ignited by the boycott, divestment, and sanctions (BDS) movement. Throughout modern Palestinian history, political efforts have been built on nationalist identifications and the nation-state as a goal. Alongside the nation as reference point, transnational and intersectional movements and objectives have also animated Palestinian politics, including pan-Arabism, pan-Islamism and the human rights movement. The BDS movement has re-ignited transnational Palestinian solidarity, and drawn into the struggle for Palestinian liberation black activists in the U.S., including members of the prison abolition movement. The Black-Palestinian solidarity movement is still in a nascent stage, and the constituent struggles remain based in nation-state imaginaries. The links that participants in the BDS and Black-Palestinian solidarity movements are fostering are not based on shared identities, however. Instead, they have developed out of shared recognition of the transnational dimensions of the experiential, rights-based, and systemic contiguities among their conditions.
INTRODUCTION
The history of transnational Palestinian solidarity politics provides a way in to thinking about the possibilities for challenging the status quo ignited by the boycott, divestment, and sanctions (BDS) movement, and the status of the nation within those efforts. The frameworks I discuss here include pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism as they came together in the 1931 Islamic Congress in Jerusalem and the 1936-1939 Arab Revolt, human rights, BDS, and the Black-Palestinian solidarity movement. Solidarity generally refers to stances and actions that come from "a sense of unity between two political actors on the basis of shared interests, understandings, or aspirations, and sometimes on the basis of a common enemy" (Khalili 2007: 278) . 1 The multiple parallels between the earlier and the contemporary moments are the focus of this essay. In each, transnational solidarity has been developed through claims to different universalizing ideologies, and through sympathy generated by representations of Palestinian suffering. In different moments, intersectional analysis of actors on the ground have also generated solidarity actions.
In some of these cases, the people involved and their motivating ideologies have challenged nationalism and proffered other-than-nationalist imaginings of a liberated future for Palestinians and others. However, where non-national or transnational imaginings have emerged, nation-state specific interests and nationalist actors have stood in tension with these more radical efforts. Debate, and sometimes paralyzing dispute, over strategies, priorities, and how to balance ideological commitment to higher values with pragmatism and local contingencies is a constant throughout this history. Such is the nature of politics, but the ramifications of these dynamics are perhaps more acute in self-consciously transnational political solidarity movements.
Another element common to these cases is the tendency of experiential dimensions and structural analyses to come in and out of focus to justify and motivate solidarity. At different moments, discursive and visual portrayals of the experience of Palestinian suffering have activated sympathy for, or identification with, the Palestinians as victims of British or Israeli brutality. The torment of Palestinians living under occupation has been regularly compared to the brutality that Blacks in South Africa or the United States experience under those discriminatory regimes. Alongside these visceral appeals to sympathy are critiques that analyze the structural, material connections that propagate those brutalities through imperial alliances and the business of militarized policing. The ways in which activists have analyzed those links between Palestinians and others, recognizing that the connections exist beyond the experiential and emerge from transnational systems of domination, has shaped the nature of the resulting solidarity.
Across some of these various moments and movements, "intersectionality" has been a framework for analysis and a prompt to action across identity and geographic boundaries. This essay engages with intersectionality as "a method and a disposition, a heuristic and analytic tool" (Carbado et al. 2013: 303) . It sheds light on the ways that people have recognized their common conditions of oppression and overlapping identities, and traces intersectionality in practice as it has generated forms of solidarity throughout this history. First coined in 1989 in an essay by Kimberlé Crenshaw, the term intersectionality refers to the ways that identity categories and dynamics such as "race, class, gender, sexuality, ethnicity, nation, ability, and age operate not as unitary, mutually exclusive entities, but as reciprocally constructing phenomena that in turn shape complex social inequalities " (1989: 139) . The concept of intersectionality offers a way to think not just about the structures that oppress, but also about shared opportunities for addressing them. Intersectionality is an activist disposition, a mode of solidarity building, and a means through which political actors come together in coalition.
A range of identity frameworks and discursive frames have functioned across Palestinian history. They have undergirded practices such as racism, colonialism, imperialism, incarceration, police and military violence, denied freedom of movement within and across borders, denied freedom of expression and political organizing, among other conditions (Collins 2015) . Following Robinson (2013) , this essay considers the ways in which such imperial-colonial regimes are intersectionally constituted in order to capture both dynamics of power and resistant formations that work in ways not captured by the notion of identity (Carbado et al. 2013: 308) . Intersectional theory developed to correct narrow (and specifically racist) analytical frames in order to better capture specific configurations of overlapping stigmatizations of dominated groups, and in a western context in which identity politics had become predominant. But intersectionality does more than help us understand "wounded identities" (Brown 1995) . Intersectionality sheds light on the actors and their conditions that have brought transversal coalitions together (whether transnational groups that emerge from nation-specific concerns, religious communities united by claims to supranational belief and belonging, or universalideological formations like human rights). As the history of the Palestinian struggle shows, intersectionality as a mode of thought and practice has been shaping political action for a long time.
In Dean Spade's analysis of intersectional politics, he argues that the methodologies of intersectional scholars and activists have, and should, critique the nation-state form itself as the engine of population control that produces the abuses being opposed. These methodologies, he writes, "bring attention to the violences of legal and administrative systems that articulate themselves as race and gender neutral but are actually sites of the gendered racialization processes that produce the nation-state" (2013: 1031). Within Palestinian solidarity politics at the grassroots and elite levels, in Palestine and elsewhere, there has been limited debate that seeks to think outside the nation-state box. Because Palestine, from an early moment, came to stand as a symbol for ideals and aspirations other than itself, paradoxically, efforts on its behalf have remained tethered to the concrete nation-place of Palestine. Those who are called to its cause, either because it is the Holy Land that is home to the third holiest site in Islam, or as the home to victims of Israel, often seen as the last or most brazen bastion of settler-colonialism, keep the liberation of Palestine, as a place for a nation-state, as a focus. The territory of the "homeland" is tethered within a nation-state ideology and political program. Although people working in solidarity for Palestine acted and identified with causes that transcended national borders, such as Islam or pan-Arabism, the nation-state has remained the consistent, overriding goal for most. However, the continued deferral of nation-state sovereignty for Palestinians, and the growing visibility of transnational linkages that tie repressive forces together ideologically and economically, has the possibility to prompt novel transnational political imaginaries and actions.
ARAB NATIONALISM AND PAN-ISLAMIC THOUGHT
People working from distinct but overlapping categories of identification have acted in common since Arabs and others recognized the threat to Palestine that Zionism and the British mandate posed. One of the earliest modes of political coalition was pan-Arabism in the late nineteenthand early twentieth-centuries, in which people from across the Arab region identified with a shared cultural and historical heritage, and argued for their independence from western domination based on those claims of shared (and noble) identity.
Intersectionality was at play in pan-Arabism insofar as people built coalitions and political visions linked to their Arab identity or common heritage in opposition to a sense of shared subjugation to imperial powers (although it was more than that, too). Arabs claimed that their shared ethnicity, their shared linguistic heritage and sense of a common long history shaped who they were in the present (Dawn 1988) . Those producing pan-Arab political thought recognized that they were up against a system of power that defined them as undeserving of political sovereignty because of their position at the intersection of race and religion. Not only were they considered an inferior, backwards race -Arab -but they were also perceived as belonging to a dangerous and fanatical religion -Islam. Pan-Arab thinkers also identified the economic drivers of imperialism as injurious to Arab peoples (Dawn 1988: 71) . They identified the operations of Orientalism and challenged the regulatory regimes of race, imperialism, and Islamo-phobic Christianity that worked in tandem to deny Arabs their collective rights. Orientalism, understood in Said's sense as a set of converging narratives and political practices (1978) , is a concept that captures the intersectionality of a repressive regime. It draws attention to the multiple and reinforcing categories that define people and underwrite practices of marginalization and disempowerment. Partly in response to that intersectional regime of repression, pan-Arabism asserted the nobility and historical depth of the Arab race and civilization, and it brought people together in common action on that basis.
Pan-Arabism might not be considered fully transnational, since "the national" was only just emerging as a relevant political framework in the region, the borders of distinct countries not yet fully erected in governmental administration or popular imagination. In the Palestinian case, the ideas, places, and imagined communities that people identified with were overlapping, as Arab cultural identity began to crystallize into an Arab nationalist politics within and against the Ottoman Empire (Khalidi 1997) . In an early survey of "Arab opinion" in 1919 a majority of the Arabs who were consulted in Palestine expressed their demand for an independent united Arab nation under a constitutional monarchy in what was then considered "Greater Syria."
2 As historian Awad Halabi (2012) argues, loyalty to the Ottoman dynasty, Muslim identity, nationalism (of a generally Arab as well as specifically Palestinian kind), and shared opposition to European rule were motivations and identifications in play for Arabs in what came to be considered Palestine well into the 1920s. 3 A geographically defined Palestine in many ways overtook (but did not eliminate) Arab nationalism as a focus and identification for political mobilization in Palestine, partially due to the specificity of the challenges facing Arabs under British rule in Palestine. When Great Britain took control of the territory, it did so with a commitment to facilitating the development of Palestine into a national homeland for the Jews. This promise, first made in 1917 by Britain's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Arthur Balfour, was incorporated into the text of the Palestine Mandate, converting that statement from one of "intention into a legally binding obligation" (Kattan 2008: xxxi) . This brief declaration positioned the nascent Zionist movement above the Arabs of Palestine, and became the bedrock justification for Great Britain's favoritism of the Jews in their administration of Palestine. The threat that Zionism posed to Islam and the Arab world became a mobilizing force that Palestinian leaders put to political use for the sake of Palestinian nationalism.
For some, Arab nationalism and Islamic identity could function "as mutually reinforcing expressions of identity" (Matthews 2006: 102) . 4 Hajj Amin al-Husayni, sought to cultivate support for Palestine throughout the Muslim world with a pan-Islamic message and networking activities. Al-Husayni had been appointed Mufti and head of the government-established Supreme Muslim Council by the British, and was a leader of the Palestinians during the Mandate. In developing support for independence against British control and the Zionist danger it propelled, he convened a pan-Islamic congress in Jerusalem in 1931. The expressed goal of the meeting was to investigate measures for the defense of Muslim interests, while the real aim "was to investigate the Zionist danger to Palestine and to its Muslim holy places" (Mattar 1988: 59) . The Palestinian leader's goal was to increase support for Arab Palestine throughout the Muslim world, but also enhance his own position in Palestine as Mufti, as go-between with the British, and as the Palestinians' best bet for achieving independence.
Invitations to Muslim and Arab countries yielded some 145 delegates from twenty countries, a reflection of the popularity of the "Pan-Islamic notion of reuniting the umma (Muslim community)" at the time (Freas 2012: 39-40) . According to Arnold Toynbee, a contemporary observer, the fact that Shi'ah Muslims were also invited "was the first outward manifestation of a new spirit of co-operation (born in part of common adversity)" (1935: 101-102) . Speakers at the Congress all made an appeal for unity in the Muslim world, and most emphasized that the Palestinian cause was a Muslim one, since Zionism threatened the Islamic integrity of Jerusalem. 5 The discussions and resolutions of the congress were pro-Palestinian, but also spanned concerns of Muslims living under regimes with anti-Muslim policies and colonial activities elsewhere, from Russia to Morocco and Libya (Toynbee 1935: 105) .
The Islamic Congress of 1931 reveals much that is interesting for the present discussion of transnational politics, showing how different strategies took inspiration and borrowed from comparatives cases, how they were negotiated within and among competing national interests, how intersectional analyses shaped their vision and self-representation. A major position that united participants in the Islamic Congress was an opposition to "'every kind of colonization,'" as the Executive Council expressed in protests dispatched to the League of Nations, Foreign Ministries, and other lofty addresses (Toynbee 1935: 107) . But the people involved were motivated by a mix of political values and goals: some were interests of national or transnational collectives, or pragmatic concerns about alliances, some were partisan interests, others were individual.
Among Palestinians, for example, nationalists opposing the Mufti believed that Arab unity was the best means to fight the imperialists, a necessary condition for achieving independence for each Arab country, itself a necessary condition for maintaining Arab unity, a goal in its own right (Matthews 2006: 132) . Arabs in Palestine and beyond were also paying attention to anti-British politics in India, and vice-versa, from a supra-national perspective of "Easternism" (Kahn 2011) . 6 Arab nationalists in Palestine had learned from, and were teaching their students about, events in India and calling on Gandhi's tactics of noncooperation as a model for their own protests. Gandhi "set the standard for activists in Palestine" (Matthews 2003: 16) . At the same time, these activists recognized how British colonial tactics that exploited sectarianism were harming the Indian independence movement and they opposed endeavors that played into this tactic in Palestine (Matthews 2003: 3-4, 7, 10-12; Matthews 2006: 133) . These Palestinian nationalists saw Hajj Amin al-Husayni, and his reliance on the British to support his institutional base, the Supreme Muslim Council, as a sectarian and partisan obstruction diverting energies away from the real problem, which was imperialism (Matthews 2006: 115, 118, 120) . Their goal, which was Palestine-focused within a larger anti-imperialist, anti-colonialist intersectional frame, remained the removal of British control of Palestine and blocking the Zionists' takeover of the country. For many Palestinians involved in these debates and activities, they directed their intersectional analysis and transnational activism towards a nationalist goal.
The transnational coalitions remained riven with nation-specific projects. The 1931 Congress posed a dilemma to the leadership in various Arab lands. Syria, negotiating for its independence from France, preferred a strategy of "'honourable co-operation'" to the anti-imperialist denunciations espoused by the Arab nationalists in Palestine who would become the Istiqlal [Independence] Party. The National Bloc, led by Syrian moderates, insisted that their strategy be solely in support of the Syrian national movement. But when this cooperative approach intended to appease the French failed, devotion to pan-Arab activities and public commitment to Palestine later became a means for the sullied moderates to "rehabilitate their reputations" using panArabism as the "ideological tool to do so" (Khoury 1985: 324-348, 327-328, 334) . Fighting for Palestine thus lent weight to the "symbolic capital" of some who were striving for Syrian national independence. This is one of many instances in which the Palestinian cause became a badge of prestige, and offered political credibility to those seen to be fighting for Palestine (cf. Khalili 2007) . 7 These lines of identification across national borders stemmed from a shared understanding that the exploitive economic gears of colonialism, although operating differently for Arabs in Syria and in Palestine, represented a common threat to their distinct national projects.
In the end, the gains of the Congress for Palestinians were more symbolic than practical. The substantial moral support for the Palestinian cause was not matched by financial or political help, because the Muslim community as it was represented at this pan-Islamic congress was politically divided (Mattar 1988: 59-64; Matthews 2003: 16; Toynbee 1935: 104) . The Congress did achieve the Mufti's personal goal of strengthening his own political position in front of the British and his people (Matthews 2006: 104, 128, 132 (Khoury 1985; Gershoni 1986 ). Indian politicians and political groups across religious affiliations remained attentive to what was happening in Palestine in this period. They expressed public sympathy for the Palestinian Arabs, and criticized the British government for its actions in their mandate (Roland 1998: 190-191) . The Revolt aroused the sympathies and passions of "the Syrian masses" and others across the Arab and Muslim worlds, too. As with the 1931 Islamic Congress, commitment to a transnational cause pulled against "personal ambition" and national "provincialism" (Khoury 1985: 332-333) .
Taking inspiration from a major Strike in Syria that happened the previous year, the Revolt became a symbol of pan-Arabism itself, attracting men from across the Arab world to fight against the British for the idea of Greater Syria (Parsons 2015: 396) . Fawzi al-Qawuqji, a veteran of the Syrian Revolt against the French, became a rebel leader in Palestine and was declared "Commander in Chief of the Arab Revolt in Southern Syria" (Khoury 1985 : 329, Parsons 2015 . Al-Qawuqji and others were drawn to defend Palestine, which they considered to be "Southern Syria," as an integral and indivisible part of a greater Arab entity, and of which they, as Syrians, were a central part (Khoury 1985: 325; Matthews 2006: 125; Parsons 2015: 397-399) . They and other Syrians knew that the strongest supporters for their own strike had come from Palestine, which compelled them to contribute in return. They also understood that the Zionist movement that was most directly threatening Palestine was likewise an "obstacle to Arab unity," that it would "jeopardize the future of neighbouring territories," and that "Zionist enterprises posed a potential danger to the Syrian economy" . Although it was in solidarity with another people, the support they expressed -through media, demonstrations, fundraising, boycotting Jewish products, arms smuggling, and providing political asylum to Palestinian leaders and guerrillas escaped to Syria (Khoury 1985: 330) -was also a means of self protection. 9 The Revolt also attracted the sympathies and active support of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers. Pan-Islamic, Egyptianist, and pan-Arab ideologies and commitments motivated their actions on behalf of Palestine. The Muslim Brothers were an organization that considered all Muslims to be part of a single community, the Islamic umma, which "superseded national, geographical or racial divisions" (El-Awaisi 1998: 2). The unity of people and belief entailed, for them, an obligation to act on behalf of other Muslims. They likewise believed that all Muslims should defend their own countries as well. Within their universalist vision of the religion, Palestine had a special significance because of its importance within the Islamic tradition, and the history of this land that was populated by the holy figures who were born, died, or traveled through there. For the Brothers, every Muslim had a duty to defend Palestine with their money and their lives (El-Awaisi 1998: 2-3, 9-10). Beyond expressions of support and educational activities about British repression in Palestine in their media, the Muslim Brothers also raised money for Palestinian victims of British violence and fighters. To assert pressure against Zionism they sent letters of protest to the League of Nations, they called for Egyptian workers to refuse work for the British in Palestine, and advocated a boycott of Jewish merchants who they believed supported Zionism (El-Awaisi 1998: 30-33,36, 43, 48-53) , (despite the fact that most Jews in Egypt were not Zionists) (Beinin [1998] 2005: 63-64). They mobilized material support by appealing to their fellow Egyptians on behalf of the "sufferers" in Palestine, organizing a "High Committee for Helping the Sufferers of Palestine," its purpose to bring aid and relief to their Muslim brethren.
10 Flyers proclaiming "Palestine Bleeds" were posted as far away as Najaf in Iraq and Dubai, describing the tortures of people in Palestine and calling on Muslims to fight.
11
In the view of the Muslim Brotherhood, the responsibility to Palestine, and arguments for opposing Zionism, were also tied to nation-specific worries, however. Like the Syrians, Egyptians believed that a hostile Jewish state in the region posed a threat to their independence and economy (El-Awaisi 1998: 17) . At the same time, they believed that Britain was the driving force behind these threats and the common enemy. With Zionism as its tool, Britain was intent on dividing and conquering the Arab-Islamic world. This meant that threats to Palestine were threats to them as Egyptians, as Arabs, and as Muslims. "'The British are fighting us, but on the Land of Palestine,'" as one Muslim Brotherhood publication expressed it. Their fates were interlocked because, in their analysis, Zionism opposed Arabs and Muslims everywhere. In another essay, they equated support with Palestine with being a true Muslim (El-Awaisi 1998: 53, 62). In contrast with the Syrian representatives who were worried about currying favor with the British, the Palestine cause was integral to the Muslim Brotherhood's own agenda. The extension of their activism beyond religious preaching and into politics itself developed out of the Palestine campaign (Gershoni 1986) . As the Muslim Brothers developed their ideology and practices, a sense of identification with Palestine and Palestinians at the national, pan-Arab, and religious levels meant that Egypt-specific concerns and transnational ideologies were in synergy.
HUMAN RIGHTS
While Syria, Egypt, India, and other countries whose people had stood up for Palestinian liberation gained their own independence, Palestine's Arabs remained subject to foreign rule. India's ongoing solidarity with the Palestinian cause was apparent in its positions expressed within the UN in its early days. India became a member of the Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) set up by the UN in 1947 to develop (yet another) plan for the resolution of the problem of Palestine. Along with Iran and Yugoslavia, India dissented from UNSCOP's majority plan of partition and voted instead for a federal plan for Palestine that would give internal autonomy to the Jews in Palestine. Although not in conformity with Arab demands calling for full independence for the Palestinian Arabs, this plan did recognize that "the peoples of Palestine are entitled to recognition of their right to independence," and emphasized that individual and communal rights should be protected by the constitution of such a federal state. The authors of the plan described it as "the most democratic solution," which would afford "an opportunity for full and effective participation in representative government to every citizen of the State. This solution would be most in harmony with the basic principles of the Charter of the United Nations" (UNSCOP 1947) .
Fighting between Zionist and Arab armies thwarted UNSCOP's majority and minority plans, and the state of Israel was declared in 1948, leaving some 750,000 Palestinian Arabs as refugees dispersed among neighboring Arab countries. The UN welcomed Israel as a member state in May of 1949, recognizing it as a "peace-loving state." As countries in the Third World were decolonized and gained independence throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the makeup of the UN shifted, and the General Assembly became a visible forum for the articulation of antiimperialism and anti-racist positions, including advocacy for the Palestinians. Opposition to apartheid and an understanding of colonialism from the perspective of the colonized were bases for their shared perspective (Allen 2016 , Chakrabarty 2010 : 51, Mazower 2009 . Although anti-colonialism and anti-Westernism characterized the discourse and attitudes of many key players in the Non-Aligned Movement, there was also "significant positive engagement with human rights by a range of newly decolonized states" (Burke 2006: 947) .
The principles of "natural rights," the right to self-determination, and human rights also have been constant reference points throughout the history of Palestinian political claim-making and solidarity building. From especially the 1980s onwards, human rights became a hegemonic idiom through which Palestinians and their international supporters called for Palestinian individual and collective rights. The vast system of human rights norms and laws, and the diverse NGOs that sought to activate them, have remained a predominant tool and forum within the Palestinian struggle for independence (Allen 2013 ).
The universalist language of human rights, the UN as a world body, and the global network of human rights NGOs presented new opportunities and challenges to the cultivation of Palestinian transnational solidarity. This channel of international support was complicated by the ideology of political neutrality that underwrote the human rights system, since the activation of that system for the political cause of Palestinian liberation could be decried as violating that neutrality. This ideology of apoliticism that was inherent to the early formulation of the human rights system ran counter to intersectional analysis. "The human" in human rights was a liberal individual who, in race-free and gender-neutral terms was figured as pre-political.
It was just this claim to apolitical universality that a group of Palestinians and their advocates sought to utilize for their own nationalist cause. The Palestinians who launched the first human rights organization in the West Bank in 1979 saw in international human rights law a tool for challenging Israeli domination on the ground and in the western understandings of Israel, which in the first years of its military occupation of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem had managed to cultivate an image of "benevolent occupation" (Shehadeh 2002: 135) . Because human rights carried the claim of embodying universal values, they believed that they could cut across the various taboos that had shielded Israel from criticism (Bisharat 2007) . Raja Shehadeh, one of these early human rights activists, took up rights work as a means to "bear witness" to the abuses wrought by Israeli occupation, to prove the state's noncompliance with international law, and to "reveal to the world the true nature of the occupation." He saw human rights as a method for urging the international community to exert moral pressure on Israel to change (Shehadeh 2002: 172-173) . Others involved at the time also believed that human rights work was a means to mobilizing international solidarity, and NGO activists continue to marshal human rights to cultivate international support for Palestine and compel a change in Israeli behavior (Allen 2013: 61, 123 ).
In the early days of his involvement in human rights activism, Shehadeh believed that his work rightfully should be separate from politics, a position that others, including his father, opposed (2002: 152, 175) . In the view of some still today, the efficacy of human rights work depends on its moral authority derived from neutral law that enshrines universal values and standards (Hopgood 2006) . Jessica Montell, former head of an important Israeli human rights organization, B'Tselem, has argued that the power of human rights can only be maintained if it is inoculated from politics, kept separate from diplomatic agreements and frameworks, political organizing, and the mobilization of constituencies (Montell 2016 (Montell , 2017 . The historiography of human rights, however, demonstrates the ideological claims and false premises that are embedded in that stance. The imbrication of human rights and politics was what ensured that the principles spelled out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights could not be enforceable, and would not impinge on the sovereignty of the Great Powers (Normand and Zaidi 2008: 113-114, 131-135) .
BOYCOTT, DIVESTMENT, SANCTIONS
Appealing to human rights as a universal and politically neutral language, and drawing attention to the sufferings caused by Israel's abuse of Palestinian rights through representations of rights violations, has produced much sympathy for Palestinians and yielded expressions of solidarity coming from many quarters. The many human rights NGOs working in the occupied Palestinian territory are also a testament to some success of the human rights system, if professionalization is an indicator (Hanafi and Tabar 2005) . They have, however, done little to shift the state structures that are the systemic cause of abuses (Allen 2009 (Allen , 2013 Sfard 2005) . A quarter of a century after the first Palestinian human rights organization was established, the Israeli occupation is only more entrenched. Countless human rights reports documenting Israeli abuses, as well as repeated efforts at political negotiations and grassroots level "dialogue," have done nothing to thwart Israeli settler-colonialism's spread. The 2005 call by Palestinian civil society to bring supporters together in a movement of boycott, divestment, sanctions (BDS) against Israeli institutions has re-ignited international Palestinian solidarity in an effort to shift that status quo.
There is no specific program within the BDS movement that seeks to lead, step by step, to a oneor two-state solution. Its goals are both broad and definite. The movement seeks to generate nonviolent forms of pressure that will compel the Israeli government to do three things: end its occupation and colonization of all Arab lands occupied in June 1967 and dismantle the Wall; recognize the fundamental rights of the Arab-Palestinian citizens of Israel to full equality; and respect, protect and promote the rights of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes and properties as stipulated in UN Resolution 194. 12 BDS itself is a human rights movement that demands justice for Palestinians, and that is pursuing a human rights agenda "which is in conformity with international law and resolutions adopted by the United Nations."
13 It is mobilizing people from very diverse backgrounds, from churches and student groups to Jewish Voice for Peace, bringing politics and human rights into a productive mélange. Inspired by the anti-apartheid movement, it is a disparate, loosely organized coalition of efforts aimed at chipping away at the benefits that the Israeli government and related institutions gain from the current situation. Rather than rely on the "expose and embarrass" methods of human rights advocacy, BDS seeks to produce conditions in which those who enjoy the status quo and who are motivated -economically, politically, ideologically -to maintain the occupation benefit less. BDS prods at this current stasis that is so comfortable for the occupiers, by de-normalizing the repression and inequality under which Palestinians live in Israel and the occupied Palestinian territory.
As it salutes "people of conscience" for expressing their "principled solidarity" (PACBI 2014), and brings people together around shared values of anti-racism and freedom, BDS parallels earlier instances of transnational solidarity mobilization in Palestine in its references to human rights and universal values. As in earlier moments of Palestinian political claim-making, the right to national self-determination is articulated as a primary goal and principle (Al-Azza 2013). What may be distinct is that this principle is not enunciated from the standpoint of national identity (Chalcraft 2015) , but rather within the frames of international law, human rights, and with continual reference to South Africa (Morrison 2015: 230) as a positive example of the power of boycott to change political structures. The movement's focus on three main forms of oppression affecting Palestinians -the unfulfilled right of return, military occupation, and discrimination against Palestinian citizens of Israel (Morrison 2015: 246) -is an intersectional approach. As such, it goes against what has become the Palestinian Authority's narrower focus on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, which had sidelined Palestinian refugees and Palestinians in Israel and in the diaspora. In contrast to the PA's approach, BDS discourse brings this range of Palestinian identity groups into a single framework of analysis and activism.
BDS also seeks to be a global and anti-racist movement (Barghouti 2010) . It draws attention to the symbolic and material similarities between Israel and other settler-colonial and racist regimes such as the United States, and to the shared violation of indigenous rights that such regimes inflict. It likewise highlights the symbolic and material connections between Israel and Apartheid South Africa. By activating this transnational intersectional perspective, the movement has drawn into its fold scholars and activists working on indigenous rights in North America and in other fields. Many make references to the "resonances" and "links" between Palestine and the conditions of unfreedom elsewhere. But as more and increasingly diverse people have pledged to respect the BDS call to boycott Israeli institutions, analyses of what does and should bring them together have become more detailed, pointing to the concrete actors and interests that link the oppressors. Activist writings and analyses are ever more attentive to not only experiential aspects that are shared across groups in different locales, but also structural dimensions that bind them. These movements are bringing transnational populations into action together, while increasing awareness of the global systems of militarized policing that afflict them in similar ways (Blumenthal 2011) , drawing attention to how the apparatuses of state violence lead national budgets away from citizen welfare. The global elite and its armed wing -state police and armies -are coming into view as a common enemy of Palestinians and US citizens.
BLACK LIVES MATTER
In addition to the many academic associations and church groups that have voted to endorse BDS, Black Lives Matter and various associated groups have also endorsed it, in recognition of the regimes of oppression and liberatory goals that their supporters share. As in earlier manifestations of international solidarity, discourse around BDS and black liberation reveals what Alex Lubin refers to as "a geography of liberation." With this term, Lubin captures "dialectal spaces produced in the collision between nationalism and colonialism, on one hand, and subaltern decolonial and liberation politics, on the other," which promote recognition of "communities of shared fate," and which can lead to political imaginaries beyond nationalism and colonialism (2014: 7, 9) . In distinction from much human rights reportage about Palestine, however, the Black-Palestinian Solidarity movement has become more visibly active in drawing out the intersectional connections between the struggles of people of color in Palestine/Israel and the US.
Disparate and dynamic, manifestations of the Black-Palestinian Solidarity are numerous, and many take BDS as a core commitment. The voicing of solidarity with Palestinians by highprofile Black intellectuals such as Angela Davis brought increasing attention to their intersecting struggles. It was publicized broadly through the "2015 Black Solidarity Statement with Palestine." 14 The Interfaith Peace-Builders, established in 2001, have brought numerous delegations of indigenous people and people of color, including African Heritage communities, from the United States to Palestine, aimed at fostering "a network of informed and active individuals who understand the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the United States' political, military, and economic role in it" (IFPB). As another example, the Palestinian Youth Movement (PYM), a transnational organization that has sought to politically mobilize the Palestinian diaspora, has allied with Black Lives Matter as well as indigenous groups (Salih et al. 2017) . And students at the foremost university in the West Bank, Birzeit, held a solidarity event around the similar struggles against racism in Palestine and Blacks in the US (Shams 2014) . The responses from Palestinians tweeting tear gas advice to protesters in Ferguson under the hashtag "#Palestine2Ferguson" in 2014 brought wider visibility to the racist violence impacted within the US and Israeli policing systems, and the training and tools shared between the two countries' militarized policing systems (Activestills 2014; Schotten 2015) . Perhaps an indication of the critical power of Black-Palestinian solidarity of this sort, the transnational advice among activists was widely covered in mainstream US and other western media, including The New York Times and USA Today (Jackson 2016 , Mackey 2014 , Molloy 2014 ). 15 The writings and representations of activists within these groups -by prominent journalists and scholar-activists, among others -consciously promote a dialectical engagement of experiential and systemic understandings of Palestinian and Black conditions of oppression, while also attending to the distinctions between the experiences of violence that characterize their different struggles. As an example, Greg Thomas curated a traveling exhibition about George Jackson, a member of the Black Panther Party, that highlights Palestinian and Black American experiences of captivity. He has analyzed themes of porous "segregation" and captivity writ large, "a condition that extends beyond incarceration in a specific kind of building with prison bars," which characterize the condition of Blacks in America and Palestinians. 16 Marc Lamont Hill made a public call for solidarity with Rasmea Odeh, a Palestinian social justice worker prosecuted in the US through what many believed to be a show trial. She was charged in federal court "with Unlawful Procurement of Naturalization, an allegation based on answers she gave on a 20-year-old immigration application." In Hill's (2015) description of her case, he highlights the similarities between the unjust and racists court systems in Israel and the US that disadvantage Palestinians and Black Americans, and that serve to thwart resistance movements in both places. He insists that Odeh's story "must also be understood as a Black story. A story of global resistance to colonial power… A story of solidarity." Lest one think this movement exists only in the rarefied confines of academia, consider American football stars, Michael Bennett and Colin Kapaernik, among others, who made waves when they declined an Israeli government-sponsored trip to Israel for NFL players. Bennett explained that his unwillingness to go to Israel resulted from learning about Palestine, and recognizing the similarities between the Black Lives and Palestinian movements (Democracy Now 2017). 17 In this discourse, common themes have emerged, highlighting shared experiences of life and suffering under militarized police, the racist ideology of Zionism, the importance of recognizing common humanity across difference, and rejection the dehumanizing effects of racist regimes (Baraka and Jackson 2014 , Bailey 2014 , Barrows-Friedman 2014 ). An historical consciousness also redounds, with analyst-activists making frequent references to important figures (Malcolm X, Stokely Carmichael, Muhammad Ali) and organizations (SNCC, Black Panther Party) in the history of Black liberation struggles. Martin Luther King's statement that injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere (King 1963 ) is also often invoked. Within these evocations of shared histories of suffering (and resistance) are clear analyses of the systemic, economic investments that US and Israeli states and companies have in today's systems of incarceration. Many point to the role of Israel in training and arming US police (Bailey 2015 , Kelley 2014 /15, Kelley 2016 . The structural analyses in this constellation of ideas and actions are not totally unique in the history of transnational solidarity with Palestine, as critiques of imperialism and capitalism fueled earlier periods of solidarity with Palestine, too. However, the resurgence of discussion and research on Black radical thought, 18 and increasing work being done to analyze the prisonindustrial complex and grow a prison abolition movement is shaping Black-Palestinian solidarity work in novel ways.
CONCLUSION
There are continuities and distinctions in the axes of the identifications that have undergirded solidarity movements across the history I have sketched here, as well as between the analyses and critiques that were part of those movements. In all cases, the groups that have expressed their solidarity have been multidimensional and dynamic. Syrians who supported the [1936] [1937] [1938] [1939] Revolt comprised "the masses" and elite politicians, moderates and pan-Arabist anti-imperialists, and then moderates who became anti-imperialists. Those who shared pan-Islamist beliefs placed different emphasis on the Arabness of Palestine, and had varying ideas about how central Palestine should be to the Islamic community. The human rights world has included NGO professionals who believe that politics must be kept separate from human rights advocacy, activists who politically deploy human rights work that is done without explicit partisan identification, and political activists who recognize in human rights an effective universal language for rousing political solidarity for a national cause.
In some moments and among some who stood with the Palestinians, sympathy for their suffering was predominant in their expressions of solidarity. Sometimes it was sympathy that emerged out of a sense of outrage at the injustices to which Palestinians were subject, under British or Israeli occupation. In other instances, sympathy has been inspired by a recognition of a shared plight, a recognition that the experiences of harassment at the hands of the police in the US are similar to what Palestinians live through in the West Bank.
The solidarity does not stop at sympathy, however, and the lines of congruence between systems of power that incarcerate and violate people across national contexts are clearly drawn. The prominence of Black intellectuals involved in the prison abolition movement, such as Angela Davis, who are also active in Palestinian solidarity work, may be part of what is influencing this discourse (Davis 2016: 51-60) . It marks a significant break with the human rights framework, that has tended to obfuscate the political, systemic and economic structures that produce rights violations, and that has for several decades been a dominant framework channeling support for the Palestinian liberation struggle. 19 An indication of how far this analysis may reach, and the influence of these new kinds of intersectional understandings, can be found in the ways these transnational understandings are trickling into unlikely quarters. In his recent memoir, No Country for Jewish Liberals, Israeli journalist Larry Derfner proclaims: "The occupation is not just a flaw, but a morally fatal flaw. It is different from apartheid, different from Jim Crow, but the same in one overriding way: It is a species of tyranny, a system of government in which the strong trample the weak. The system Israel runs on the three million people of the West Bank is military dictatorship" (2017: 13).
As John Chalcraft has observed, the BDS movement's "de facto mode of identification is multitudinous" (2015) . Without requiring any shared and singular "identity," people have found in BDS a channel through which to come together through intersectional analysis and action around these broad human rights goals. It is prompting collective action within professional associations, sparking new considerations of what businesses to patronize, inspiring people to seek change within their local academic structures, to shape their artistic interactions, and to demand accountability from their entertainers (and be accountable entertainers) as much as their political leaders. Because it is working to galvanize solidarity and organize action, it has gotten under the skin of the Israeli government, which is investing considerable resources in trying to
